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We care deeply about what other people think of us, to such an extent that we may do 
seemingly irrational things in order to influence their opinion. This is not a new insight. The 
period ca.1650-1800 witnessed a concerted, if neglected debate about the implications of 
mankind’s desire for recognition, which bore directly on discussions of sociability and 
toleration. Here Thomas Hobbes’s writings acted as a powerful stimulus. Hobbes argued that 
even as the desire for recognition in mankind’s natural condition induces individuals to seek 
society, recognition-seeking generates a mistrust and violence that precludes its realization. 
Political authority, allied to the ecclesiastical, is required to constrain men to recognize their 
mutual obligations to one another: vertical toleration is necessary for horizontal tolerance 
between individuals to be realizable. The Church of Scotland minister and Professor at St 
Andrews, Archibald Campbell (1691-1756) offered a comprehensive challenge to Hobbes’s 
interpretation of the relationship between recognition and toleration. Campbell vindicated the 
desire for esteem from both a moral and a theological perspective: the pursuit of recognition 
induces us to accommodate our opinions and actions to those of others with whom we live. It 
gives rise to sociability and mutual fellowship. Yet Campbell accepted that the economy of 
esteem had been corrupted in ‘civilized’ societies, and implicated institutional religion in this 
development. Toleration, he concluded, could not hope to salve the wounds caused by the 
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Introduction: esteem, hypocrisy and habituation 
We care deeply about what other people think of us, to such an extent that we may do 
seemingly irrational things in order to influence their opinion. This is not a new insight, 
although it has received renewed attention in our own highly networked age.2 The period 
ca.1650-1800 witnessed a concerted, if neglected, debate about the implications of mankind’s 
desire for recognition, which bore directly on discussions of sociability and toleration.3 This 
aspect of human nature raises disquieting concerns. The criteria by which the worth of people 
and things are evaluated in any given society might appear to be arbitrary. Further, if our 
concern for the applause of others suggests that all the world’s a stage on which we play our 
parts,4 are we all hypocrites, acting in ways that garner others’ approval, even if they 
contravene our deepest moral and religious convictions? Neo-Augustinians like Blaise Pascal 
and Pierre Nicole could affirm this, whilst observing that dissimulation might have beneficial 
social and political consequences.5 The desire for recognition, as Augustine argued, 
incentivized pagan individuals, ignorant of the true God, to perform acts of heroic patriotism. 
But at a more banal level, the concern to ‘fit in’ powerfully induces every self-loving 
individual to adhere to shared norms of propriety – even if such a self-serving motive strips 
the actions to which it leads of merit in the judgment of God, who can alone read men’s 
hearts.6 A society of atheists, Bayle suggested, is a possibility: a concern to secure praise and 
avoid contempt, along with the incentives provided by civil law, is sufficient to keep men on 
the straight and narrow.7 
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Yet suspicions remained that the causal relationship between outward action and 
internal opinion is more complex than a focus on hypocrisy alone can accommodate. The 
theory of religious intolerance was predicated upon this logic: although external coercion 
cannot reach the inner man, it might nonetheless reorient the will so as to open the 
understanding to better sources of information.8 Even as his famous distinction between 
outward conduct and internal belief might be read as an endorsement of systemic hypocrisy, 
the success of Hobbes’s educative mission in Leviathan arguably presupposes that our 
opinions are susceptible to such alteration by external discipline. For Hobbes, then, the 
question is not whether we are all actors reciting scripts that we learn by heart through 
processes of socialization, so much as what those scripts are and who author(ize)s them.9 
Might the social sanctions of praise and contempt, enforcing norms of conduct that develop 
endogenously through our mutual interactions, discipline us in ways that are reliably 
generative of social peace and mutual fellowship? Hobbes canvassed this possibility,10 but 
argued forcefully in the negative: the desire for recognition ensures that the natural condition 
is one of competition, conflict and misery. An opposite interpretation was explored most 
comprehensively by a relatively neglected figure in early eighteenth-century Scotland: the 
Presbyterian minister and Professor of Church History at the University of St Andrews, 
Archibald Campbell (1691-1756). 
A study of Campbell’s writings – particularly An Enquiry into the Original of Moral 
Virtue (1733) – is illuminating for five reasons in particular.11 First, Campbell presented his 
work (quite plausibly) as intervening in a debate about the desire for recognition and its 
consequences that had been ongoing practically since the inception of Occidental political 
philosophy.12 Second, he nonetheless emphasized that the debate over recognition had 
recently been reanimated, and reoriented, primarily due to Hobbes’s intervention. Campbell 
grasped what, until recently, scholars have overlooked: that Hobbes, rather than Rousseau, 
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was the first to claim that the fundamental problems of politics stem ‘from the politics of 
recognition’.13 Third, Campbell understood recognition to raise questions that bore directly 
upon toleration and tolerance. If our desire for esteem makes us radically sensitive to others’ 
opinions, perhaps (as Hobbes argued) we cannot disagree peaceably: every sign of 
disagreement, however trivial, generates animosity. Toleration as political policy, and 
tolerance as self-control, are imperative if we are to live together in society. Disagreement is 
endemic; it cannot be overcome. But we might learn prudently to conceal it beneath the 
external veneer of mutual complaisance.14 Campbell, however, argued that our concern for 
esteem leads us to accommodate our opinions, not merely our actions, to our neighbours’: 
thereby generating a broad consensus regarding the propriety of modes of conduct that affect 
all members of our community (rather than merely our own well-being). Consequently, 
toleration and tolerance appear both less demanding and less necessary: required only in our 
discussions of purely speculative issues of no practical consequence. Fourth, Campbell’s 
critique of Hobbes’s interpretation of the desire for recognition and its implications for 
sociability was indebted to a number of Hobbes’s English critics who are, like Campbell, 
neglected today and who, like Hobbes, worked within the framework of Protestant natural 
jurisprudence. This is significant, because Campbell’s theory of sociability was predicated 
upon a more positive evaluation of the theological, rather than merely the moral character of 
the passion – self-love, as it takes the form of the desire for esteem – that animates our 
conduct as creatures who desire happiness. The rehabilitation of pride, or self-love, was not 
the sole achievement of secular ethical naturalists such as Hume and Smith.15  
This, however, brings us to the fifth reason why Campbell’s Enquiry merits close study. 
Campbell maintained that the economy of esteem had been corrupted in modern societies: 
whilst unnatural, intolerance had become ubiquitous. In explaining how this corruption had 
occurred, the Presbyterian minister directly implicated institutional religion – not least of a 
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Calvinist variant. The invasion of dogmatic theology into the public square, assisted by the 
Christian magistrate, had deformed esteem-relations between individuals, by teaching and 
incentivising them to evaluate one another according to their ‘right opinion’ (orthodoxy) on 
purely speculative questions on which disagreement was inevitable. Campbell fully accepted 
the insight of theorists of intolerance that external constraints and incentives have profound 
and lasting effects on the inner man. The ‘orthodox’ had succeeded only too well in their aim: 
to make men more concerned with the supposed truth of others’ speculative opinions than 
with the propriety and merit of their moral actions and intentions. It was because of this 
pathogenesis of European societies – and not human nature itself, as he held both Hobbes and 
orthodox theologians who defended the doctrine of original sin to maintain – that toleration 
and tolerance had now become a regrettable necessity. For Campbell this represented the 
tragic subversion of God’s providential plan for mankind, in which the desire for recognition 
is hardwired into our nature to induce us to live in mutual fellowship, peace and love.  
 
Hobbes and Aristotle: self-love and love of others 
Immediately upon its publication in 1733, Campbell’s Enquiry was subjected to examination 
by the Church of Scotland’s Committee for the Purity of Doctrine.16 The Committee was 
particularly alarmed by Campbell’s fundamental claim that self-love, as it takes the form of 
the desire for esteem, is ‘a laudable Principle, in the Business of Moral Virtue’. It alone 
motivates us to the virtue and piety required of us by our Creator (OMV I.i.5-7).17 The 
Committee raised two objections. First, self-love is indicative of post-lapsarian 
concupiscence: it cannot issue in virtue or piety because, as Augustine argued, it is a 
‘perverted imitation’ of the true love (of God) that ought to motivate both.18 Fallen man 
requires the (unmerited) assistance of divine grace if his affective economy is to be 
regenerated: something Campbell was accused of denying. Campbell had fallen into the error 
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of heathen philosophers like Cicero – whom he cited repeatedly – who was assailed by 
Augustine for advancing the ‘pestilential opinion’ that actions might be virtuous even when 
motivated by a concern for the ‘fickle opinion of men’ rather than ‘pursued for the sake of the 
true good’ (God’s glory) (OMV II.x.450-55).19 ‘Self-love and Self-seeking’, the Committee 
observed, ‘are mentioned among the Sins forbidden in the first Commandment’, which 
exhorts us to love God, not ourselves, with all our heart, soul and mind.20 Self-love is ‘a 
Passion most impious’, ‘highly dishonouring to God’, and ‘quite contrary to the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ’.21 
The Committee’s second objection concerned the practical implications of the desire for 
recognition, which it held to be ‘every way destructive to the Peace and Happiness of 
Mankind’.22 Esteem-seeking must be suppressed if we are to live together peaceably here and 
entertain any prospect of happiness hereafter. To this end, state and church must work 
together: the former imposing the constraints of civil law, the latter preaching God’s word and 
opening men’s hearts to His redemptive grace. Campbell, conversely, maintained that the 
desire for recognition provides ‘a strong & large foundation of sociableness among men’.23 It 
is the cramping of self-love demanded by the orthodox, rather than its free indulgence, that 
characterizes intolerant and uncivilized societies. In arguing that the desire for recognition 
precludes peace and fellowship, which relies instead upon the erection of sovereign authority 
allied to the ecclesiastical, Campbell warned his orthodox critics that their position was 
uncomfortably close to that of Hobbes and Mandeville. All portrayed mankind as a blemish 
on God’s creation, animated by a craven self-love that precludes the possibility of mutual 
fellowship. The only difference is that, for Hobbes and Mandeville, the (partial) redemption 
of human nature would be a political achievement, whereas for the orthodox it also required 
supernatural regeneration. In taking issue with Hobbes, Campbell made it clear to his fellow 
ministers that other targets of his critique could be found rather closer to home.24 
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Campbell maintained that Hobbes’s denial of natural human sociability was flawed, for 
two reasons above all. First, in setting up his argument against Aristotle’s account of love 
(philia) as naturally uniting men together in fellowship, Hobbes had misconstrued the theory 
of friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics.25 There, Aristotle ridiculed the idea that the solitary 
individual could lead a flourishing (eudaimōn) life. We rely upon others to provide us with 
those goods that we consider to be essential to our happiness, which are not confined to those 
things that we require for our physical well-being: ‘Nobody would choose to have all possible 
good things on the condition that he must enjoy them alone; for man is a social being, and 
designed by nature to live with others’.26 Society affords human beings the opportunity to 
exchange the greatest good of all – their mutual love – by consolidating the bonds of 
friendship: a relationship characterised by reciprocity and equality.27  
Hobbes accepted that men would naturally desire society even if they enjoyed all the 
‘other goods’ required for physical self-preservation. Taking himself to contradict Aristotle, 
however, Hobbes maintained that society ‘is a product of love of self, not of love of friends’.28 
Even as it requires society for its satisfaction, self-love seeks a good of the mind – ‘honour’ 
and ‘reputation’ – the pursuit of which precludes the acknowledgement of mutual equality 
upon which friendship relies. Were Aristotle’s theory true we would love all men equally, 
rather than exercise discretion in choosing some (those with the power to assist us) above 
others.29 The desire for reputation explains this tendency: honour is a positional good, which 
‘is nothing if everybody has it, since it consists in comparison and pre-eminence’.30 It is also a 
form of power. The desire for glory generates a competition for recognition in which there 
must be winners and losers; and, as in a competition for material goods, the strong and proud 
will seek to dominate others by coercive means.31 This leads to relationships characterized by 
dominion and subjugation, and by flattery not friendship.32 Substituting self-love and the 
desire for recognition for Aristotle’s natural love of others, Hobbes concluded that even as we 
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need it to attain the ends set for us by our natural passions, we are born unfit for society. It is 
‘men’s mutual fear’, born primarily of the competition generated by recognition-seeking, and 
not ‘mutual human benevolence’ that provides the foundation for any ‘large and lasting 
society’.33 The sovereign is required to instil fear in those in whom the desire for recognition 
is strongest, thereby emancipating the modest from their fear of the vainglorious. All subjects 
are constrained (and educated) to acknowledge their mutual equality as subjects under the 
awful ‘mortal God’: the Leviathan, the king of the children of pride.34  
Campbell, however, maintained that for Aristotle, as for most classical philosophers, 
friendship was the fruit of self-love, not some innate other-regarding affection: ‘In the 
Opinion of this Philosopher [Aristotle], Self-love universally prevails, and gives Life to our 
kindest and most social Dispositions’ (OMV II.viii.388).35 Love of others results from our 
attempts to satisfy our self-love, which gradually expands outwards to include family, friends, 
neighbours, countrymen – and eventually mankind and God himself (OMV I.i.5-7; 
II.vi.324).36 This explains why, initially, we do not love all mankind equally, because ‘we 
affect and value other intelligent Beings in Proportion to their Benevolence towards us, or 
according as they contribute to give us Pleasure, or to advance our Happiness’ (OMV 
II.vii.360). We value them, in other words, according to their willingness to do good unto us – 
that is, for Campbell, for their virtue. In emphasizing the importance of self-love, and 
particularly the desire for recognition in Aristotle’s theory of sociability, Campbell indicated 
that Aristotle’s position was actually close to Hobbes’s. Human beings are animated by their 
desire for pleasure, and aversion to pain; and the greatest pleasure – a pleasure of the mind – 
is to have one’s sense of self-worth affirmed by other intelligent beings (OMV I.iii.48-9). It is 
this desire for recognition that induces us to seek company with others, not natural 
benevolence. This explains why Campbell drew upon Aristotle to critique Francis 
Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of Beauty and Virtue (1725), which defended 
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natural human sociability and benevolence from Hobbes’s and Mandeville’s ‘neo-Epicurean’ 
theories. For Hutcheson the desire for pleasure, including esteem, cannot issue in truly 
meritorious acts; such pleasure is merely an additional reward that accompanies virtuous 
actions performed from disinterested motives.37 Hutcheson, ‘(in the Opinion of Aristotle, to 
the great Prejudice of Moral Virtue) rejects all Pleasure whatsoever’, and thereby strips us of 
the one motive (the pleasure of esteem) that leads us to virtue (OMV II.vi.334).  
In highlighting this common ground between Aristotle and Hobbes, however, Campbell 
endeavoured to expose a second flaw in the latter’s theory of sociability. If Hobbes had been 
correct to identify the desire for recognition as often the most powerful of our desires – even 
trumping self-preservation – he had fundamentally misunderstood how esteem-seeking and -
giving works. Campbell’s theory presupposed that our desire for esteem leads us, naturally 
and necessarily, to accommodate our conduct to others’ opinions of how we ought to act. 
Along with its behavioural implications, however, the desire for esteem has significant 
cognitive consequences. By according our fellow men the authority to judge the propriety and 
merit of our actions and character, we are habituated into ideas of what is estimable and 
contemptible that are not subjective, but rather generated by all members of society 
collectively as they converse, interact, and pursue their common interests. The desire for 
esteem habituates us into ways of acting and reflecting on our actions that take account of the 
concerns of our neighbours. This facilitates our willingness to acknowledge our mutual 
equality as human beings. In embracing self-love as the passion that leads us into society, but 
rejecting the conclusions Hobbes drew from this insight, Campbell was not alone. He was 
following in the footsteps of earlier English philosophers who endeavoured to undermine 
Hobbes’s theory from within the framework of Protestant natural jurisprudence, and without 




Esteem, interdependence and equality: Clarke of Hull, after Richard Cumberland 
In his writings, Campbell nowhere refers to the recent publications of the obscure Hull 
schoolmaster, John Clarke (1687-1734). Yet he was aware of the convergence between their 
moral theories – if only because his close friend, John Simson, continually drew his attention 
to it.38 Responding to the Committee, however, Campbell did foreground his debts to other 
English authors. The Committee accused Campbell of making ‘Self-love to be the Standard of 
Moral Virtue, and not the Will or Law of God’. Campbell retorted that he had not written in 
the idiom of natural jurisprudence, and consequently did not discuss at any length ‘the Nature 
and Sanction and Promulgation of a Law, the Right and Character of the Lawgiver, and the 
Obligation that other Beings are under to submit and obey’.39 His vindication of self-love was, 
however, indebted to the insights of those who had written in this idiom. Campbell declared 
that his moral theory was ‘well supported’ by the Anglican bishop, Richard Cumberland 
(1632-1718), ‘whose excellent Treatise concerning the Laws of Nature is an ample 
demonstration of the Truth of my Account of Moral Virtue’. Campbell referred to 
Cumberland’s De legibus naturae (1672), which was formulated as a sustained critique of 
Hobbes. Campbell then mentions two further English philosophers, both of whom had 
published treatises of natural law that purported to be translated abridgements of 
Cumberland’s prolix Latin original. The first was Samuel Parker’s Demonstration of the 
Divine Authority of the Law of Nature and of the Christian Religion (1681); and the second, 
James Tyrrell’s Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature (1692). These three authors, Campbell 
declared, ‘who have acquired no contemptible Character in the learned World, and are 
counted to have done good Service to the Interests of Religion’ emphasized that virtue and 
piety depend upon the enlargement of self-love that occurs as individuals come into contact – 
and seek one another’s esteem – in society.40 
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In his publications of the mid-1720s – the period in which Campbell was drafting the 
Inquiry – Clarke accepted many of Hobbes’s most important insights regarding human 
nature.41 This included the claim that law is only ‘brought home to mankind’ and held to be 
obligatory in foro externo to the extent that its precepts are ‘made a part of’ an individual’s 
sense of happiness. Law must appeal to the self-love of those subject to it. The performance 
of our moral duties must be pleasurable: it is ‘the Desire for Pleasure, which is Self-love’ that 
motivates us to virtue, contrary to Hutcheson’s claims.42 It is simply a fact of human 
psychology that ‘no Man can desire, or be under a Concern for, the Happiness of others, but 
where it makes a part of his own’.43 Clarke’s vindication of self-love was predicated on two 
related presuppositions, which Campbell shared. First, for Clarke as for most Protestant 
natural jurists of voluntarist persuasions (including Hobbes), all law originates in the will of a 
superior. Particular acts are only deemed moral and obligatory because an authority 
promulgates them to their subjects and enforces them with sanctions. The authority in 
question is God; and His will is laid down for mankind in the form of natural law.44 Second, 
and crucially, God has created human nature so as to ensure that virtuous actions tend to be 
rewarded with pleasure, and vicious ones with pain.45 If we love ourselves first and best – as 
for Clarke was evidently the case – then God created us this way, and for a purpose.46 The 
attempt to satisfy our self-love leads us to recognize the necessity of satisfying the self-love of 
others as a means to this end. Love of others is the outgrowth of the love of self, as parental 
affection illustrates; and the eventual (and natural) terminus of this love is God, whom we 
encounter by, through and after our affections have already extended to embrace our fellow 
men. Our love of self cannot be understood as ‘a perverted imitation’ of the love of God, as 
by Augustine. It comes first, and leads outwards (via a love of children, neighbours, 
countrymen etc.) to piety: a claim endorsed by Campbell.47 
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Clarke similarly maintained that those who decry self-love as an inherently immoral 
principle would strip mankind of the one motive that God had given us to live as He 
requires.48 Here there was little to choose between Hobbes, Hutcheson, Mandeville and those 
rigid ‘Calvinists’ who portray mankind as ‘a parcel of poor, sorry, Self-ended Wretches, 
whose Behaviour has nothing of Virtue in it, nothing Amiable or Commendable at all’ – 
because all demand that mankind perform the impossible deed of denying the self-love that 
alone animates their conduct.49 If such a denial of self-love breeds hypocrisy and corrodes 
trust between men, so it also alienates man from God: because self-love alone leads to 
friendship on the one hand, and a sincere love of God on the other. If God really demands that 
we deny our self-love, then He asks of us something of which (due to His design) we are 
constitutionally incapable. Who could feel sincere love and gratitude to such an unreasonable 
(‘Epicurean’) deity? Our worship of Him would, like our expressions of friendship to our 
fellow men, have the character of base flattery rather than genuine esteem and affection.50 
Clarke’s publications were short pièces d’occasion, which had the effect of showing 
that neither the appeal to an autonomous faculty of reason (William Wollaston, Samuel 
Clarke) nor to a discrete faculty of the ‘moral sense’ (Hutcheson) could adequately overcome 
the insights into human psychology provided by Hobbes and Mandeville.51 Unlike Campbell, 
Clarke did not invoke the authority of other philosophers, ancient or modern, who grounded 
morality in the enlargement of self-love. His debts to Cumberland, possibly mediated by 
Parker and Tyrrell, nonetheless seem clear. Cumberland’s De legibus offered to explain how 
God’s moral law – captured in the ‘golden rule’ of the Gospel to love one’s neighbour as 
oneself, which Cumberland took as his epigraph – was ‘brought home’ to creatures who are 
first and foremost animated by their self-love. Cumberland did so with recourse to his most 
original contribution to natural law theory: his doctrine of natural sanctions.52 The most 
conspicuous shortcoming of Hobbes’s theory, for Cumberland, was its failure to consider 
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how, through their iterative mutual interactions, men’s sense of their own interests would 
adapt to take account of the interests of other people. Just as mankind’s encounters with the 
natural world taught them that some things are good for us as a species and others harmful – 
fire burns; some foodstuffs replenish, others poison – so the same process occurred in social 
life.53 The individual learned that some actions – seizing another’s food supply, or harming 
their child – would stimulate resentment, and possibly violent retaliation; others – coming to 
their aid should they fall victim to a third party, for example – would secure their goodwill, 
and possibly lead them to reciprocate should the opportunity arise.54 Eventually, however, 
individuals would discover that the esteem of other rational creatures is itself the source of the 
most acute and enduring pleasure. To secure it, they would amend their behaviour, to bring it 
into line with the concerns and expectations of observing others.55 
Cumberland, like Campbell, understood our desire for esteem within a framework of 
divine teleology: human nature has been created so as to make our happiness dependent upon 
the happiness of those with whom we live. As certain forms of conduct (refraining from 
stealing, protecting others from injury, showing liberality where possible, reciprocating good 
deeds) please every member of society, so such actions are consistent with the precepts of a 
natural law to which we all gradually recognize ourselves beholden. Insofar as respecting or 
transgressing these norms will incur the esteem or contempt of our neighbours, such 
judgments might be interpreted as natural sanctions enforcing the law of nature. This shows, 
as Clarke maintained, that the laws of nature are truly laws in our natural condition, as 
attended by sanctions that make compliance obligatory on creatures who cannot but pursue 
their happiness: 
 
The Laws of Nature have an intrinsical and essential Proof of their Obligation, taken 
from the Rewards or Increase of Happiness which attends the benevolent Person 
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from the natural efficacy of his Actions, and follows the Man who studiously 
observes these Laws; and from the Punishments, or Degrees of Misery, which, 
whether they will or no, they call upon themselves, who either do not obey, or do 
oppose, the Conclusions of right Reason.56 
 
In maintaining that pre-political communities might identify the precepts of natural law due to 
their evident utility, and individuals feel obligated to live accordingly due to the ‘natural 
sanctions’ enforcing them, Cumberland confronted a further challenge posed by Hobbes. Men 
might live according to natural law without any knowledge of its author: God. Hobbes had, 
after all, placed strict limits on the reach of natural theology: reason might identify the 
existence of an omnipotent first cause whom we fear, but could say nothing about its nature or 
attributes.57 Campbell’s theological writings advanced a similar point.58 Cumberland 
maintained that we acquire our idea of God’s infinite perfections – and come to love, not fear 
God – through our love of our fellow man, which occurs once our self-love expands outwards. 
Here again Augustine had it wrong: rather than loving man on account of our love of God, we 
love God on account of our love of self and our fellow men: 
 
It may indeed be affirm’d, that the Knowledge of our-selves and others, and also 
Charity and Justice towards Men, may be deduced from the Study of God’s Glory. 
But the Knowledge and Love of ourselves and other Men include a natural 
Perfection, (in possession whereof some part of Human Happiness consists,) 
essential and proper to themselves, which we can come to the Knowledge of, without 
deducing it from God’s Honour. Nay, we seem first to know and love Man, before 
the Mind raises it-self to the Knowledge and love of God, whose Being, and amiable 




For Cumberland, just as the commerce in esteem between individuals creates bonds of mutual 
friendship, so the same holds in our relations with God. Like the person possessed of enlarged 
self-love, and unlike the vainglorious Hobbesian esteem-seeker, God takes no pleasure in the 
servile flattery of those who revere Him solely for His power rather than His good-will. 
Indeed, we come to know God ‘through’ man in part because He shares that aspect of human 
nature that Campbell was determined to vindicate: our desire for esteem. As Cumberland 
noted, God, like man, desires to ‘be lov’d and honoured’; and if God shares it, then ‘it is 
certain, that the desire to be belov’d, implies no Imperfection in Man’.60 To assert the contrary 
is to portray God in an Epicurean light, as utterly uninterested in us (and thus unworthy of our 
love and gratitude).61 
 
Campbell on (mis)recognition  
The theories of Clarke and Cumberland provide a better sense of what induced Campbell to 
mount his vindication of self-love, and especially the desire for esteem. Campbell endorsed 
Hobbes’s insight that ‘the Desire of Esteem, or of being regarded, is an Appetite that 
universally prevails over Mankind’, whilst challenging the conclusions Hobbes drew from it 
(OMV I.iii.53). On Campbell’s interpretation, Hobbes accepted that the ‘Desire for Esteem’ 
was inseparable from ‘the Desire of Society’; but he argued that esteem-seeking nonetheless 
frustrates sociability by generating a competition that leads to ‘one Man’s treacherously 
imposing upon another’. The prideful individual demands recognition from others but is 
unwilling to reciprocate (OMV I.v.90). This destroys the mutual trust, affection and 
commitment to abide by shared norms upon which all society depends.  
Campbell declared that Hobbes, unlike Aristotle, misunderstood how esteem relations 
operate. We simply cannot coerce others into showing us esteem because, as Clarke observed, 
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‘[w]e are not at Liberty to love as we list’.62 It would be futile for the esteem-seeker to attempt 
to coerce others, and similarly futile for the magistrate to compel subjects to value one 
another as he determines they ought. Esteem must be freely given as a gift, a true expression 
of goodwill (OMV I.viii.204).63 Even when coerced, we cannot easily conceal our true 
judgments of another’s merit; and for another’s esteem to mean anything, I must believe it to 
be a sincere reflection of the merit they see in me. For the esteem-seeker there is no short-cut. 
If I desire your esteem, I must endeavour to deserve it by satisfying your sense of what is 
estimable, and not my own: 
 
If ever we expect to have the Favour and Commendation of those Beings with whom 
we are joined in Society, we must necessarily adapt our Behaviour to the 
Gratification of their Self-love, or their natural Desire of Well-being. This is the 
Method we must needs take; and there is manifestly no other Course whatsoever, 
which we can invent to our selves, or that can be proposed to us by others, that can at 
all serve our Purpose. (OMV I, “Appendix”, 103-4) 
 
Insofar as the desire for esteem compels us to accommodate ourselves to the self-love of 
others, it generates concord, not conflict; friendship, not flattery. It facilitates those ties of 
mutual love and affection that Aristotle held to be natural, and Hobbes and Mandeville 
deemed impossible: 
 
For as all rational Agents whatsoever are intirely under the absolute Government of 
Self-love, and can favour Nothing, at any Rate, but as it serves to gratify this 
Principle, or to assist and relieve their natural Desire of Well-being; so it is very 
obvious, that … we directly strike in with [others’] Self-love, and immediately 
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conspire and co-operate with them in a joynt hearty Pursuit after their Happiness; 
whereby we become the same, in a manner, with themselves, they must love us, or, 
that they cannot but love us, as they do themselves; and highly esteem and applaud 
us. (OMV I, “Appendix”, 142-3) 
 
Campbell’s language is revealing – ‘conspire’, ‘cannot but’ – because it discloses a conviction 
that God has, so to speak, hardwired the love of esteem into our nature. As His creatures we 
perform His will, without a great deal of reflection on our part, because:  
 
the Desire of Esteem universally determines us to pursue Love towards others, or to 
exert ourselves into all virtuous Actions whatsoever (for these are the only Means, 
that can effectually recommend us to the good Opinion and Love of others) so from 
hence we cannot but have the most elevated Apprehensions of the wonderful 
Goodness and wise Contrivance of the great Parent of Mankind, who, in the Nature 
of Things, has determin’d us to pursue Virtue, with a View to raise such Affections 
(Love and Esteem) in other rational Agents, as render them likewise virtuous, or 
morally good towards us. By which Means, there is made the best and ample 
Provision possible, to secure every one’s Ease and Comfort; we are all deeply 
engag’d in a generous Contention, a noble Plot, to promote each other’s Felicity. 
And if we follow this divine Constitution of Things, we shall all endeavour, to the 
utmost of our Power, to be joyful and happy in one another, through the whole 




Those who are most concerned to secure recognition – for Hobbes, the most prideful, wilful 
and antisocial – are those who, for Campbell, are most obliged to accommodate themselves to 
others. They are the most interdependent of all, and the least self-willing, because their 
craving for recognition subjects their ‘Ease to the Opinion of the World’ (OMV II.ix.442-3). 
Here Campbell reversed Hobbes’s contention that in our natural condition the desire for 
recognition precludes us from acknowledging our mutual equality. If we desire that others 
‘count us worthy’ of happiness and ‘conspire’ with our efforts to attain it, this in turn requires 
us to count others worthy to judge our merit, and thereby to acknowledge them as ‘being our 
Equals’ (OMV I.ii.36; II.iv.313-14). We take pleasure in the esteem of all rational creatures – 
not merely those whom we consider to be our superiors (as for Hobbes). Even ‘the meanest 
Mortal’ can form judgments and ‘entertain us with his good Opinion and Love’, and we 
‘must, and do, esteem and value that Mind’ that ‘can form a Judgment of our Case, approve 
our being happy, and heartily concur with us in our Endeavours to be so’ (OMV I.ii.36; 
II.viii.380; II.iv.313-4). Our desire for esteem compels us to recognize our shared (and equal) 
humanity, because as rational creatures we all have the power to form judgments and to 
gratify one another’s self-love. 
Campbell nonetheless observed that Hobbes’s interpretation of the desire for 
recognition seemed plausible to contemporary readers. This was because, in modern societies, 
the economy of esteem had been subverted. Rousseau would later famously declare that 
Hobbes ‘spoke of Savage Man and depicted Civil man’.64 The less heralded figures of 
Cumberland and Campbell had already made this observation.65 Paraphrasing, as would 
Rousseau, Book 2 of Aristotle’s Politics, Campbell protested that ‘it seems to me not a fair 
Way of dealing, to take our Notions of human Nature from those Individuals in civil 
Societies… in whom human Nature is most depraved and corrupted’ (OMV I, “Appendix”, 
236). Campbell readily conceded that ‘’tis very certain, that, in politick Societies, where there 
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are so many Distinctions of Life’, men ‘lie much exposed to have the Balance of their Nature 
spoiled’. This resulted in a depraved ‘second Nature’, which Hobbes mistook for the original 
(OMV I, “Appendix”, 236). Campbell drew attention to ‘the Shifts, Tricks, and Artifice of 
civilized Mankind’: ‘In short, if we will trace the Dispositions and Conduct of the human 
Species from their first uniting together in civil Societies, we shall find, that, from great 
Innocency and Integrity of Manners, they have gone aside, and increas’d in mutual Mischiefs, 
from one Generation to another’ (OMV I, “Appendix”, 245). In such ‘civilized’ societies, it is 
indisputable that the desire for esteem leads some individuals (or groups) to attempt to 
subjugate others. Where once the desire for recognition ensured that ‘whatever was done to 
the Prejudice of any one Individual, was highly resented by the whole Species’, this no longer 
holds true (OMV I, “Appendix”, 242-3).  
Campbell drew attention, as would Rousseau and Smith later, to the capacity of 
economic forces to subvert men’s ability to value one another according to their moral 
achievements, rather than material endowments – even as he pushed back against 
Mandeville’s simplistic identification of ‘luxury’ with vice (OMV I.ii.44-8).66 But much the 
most important cause of corruption occurred when the magistrate decreed that ‘a particular 
Set of Principles’ – meaning theological principles – ‘have, exclusive of all others, secular 
Advantages annexed to them’. This represented the invasion of dogmatic institutional 
religion, armed with the sanctions of civil law, into the public square. The enforcement of 
‘orthodoxy’ made social esteem the preserve of those who subscribed to speculative ‘Articles 
of Religion’. Even if dissenters were granted ‘toleration’, this word for Campbell had few 
positive connotations. To employ Rainer Forst’s terminology, the introduction of ‘vertical’ 
toleration – which variously includes, contingently accommodates, or excludes different 
people from the realm of acceptability – had destroyed the ‘horizontal’ bonds of affection that 
had previously united all members of a community in equal fellowship.67 Had the magistrate 
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not enforced conformity to ‘abstracted … Points of Knowledge or Learning, that have no 
Influence on a Man’s present Circumstances, I am apt to believe, that People [would] differ 
from one another, with a good Deal of Charity and mutual Forbearance’. It was only because 
intolerant ecclesiastics and magistrates had interfered with the economy of esteem that 
‘toleration’ was required in the first place. Rather than a necessary means to foster sociability, 
the very notion of toleration – which asks us to forebear our fellow men, rather than to love 
and esteem them – indicated that the bonds that tie us together had already been ruptured. A 
climate of intolerance was created in which disagreement inevitably bred conflict, as Hobbes 
(falsely) assumed it must. Different sects learned that recognition (by the magistrate) required 
them ‘to keep out, or dispossess the other [sect] of those Honours, Riches, and Preferments of 
which they are ambitious’ (OMV I, “Appendix”, 224-5), thus generating a competition for 
recognition that invariably oppressed the powerless and advantaged the powerful. 
In such societies, self-love became ‘narrow and contracted’, with individuals concerned 
solely with their own advancement and that of their brethren. The modern age bred 
‘Enthusiasts’, defined by Campbell as individuals who take themselves to enjoy direct 
friendship with God, and thereby to have no concern for the opinions and affection of their 
fellow mortals. Such individuals – among whom Campbell assuredly included his clerical 
inquisitors – cease to accord other men authority to judge of their merit and propriety. This 
renders them insensible to the kinds of intersubjective processes that enlarge self-love in 
necessary and beneficial ways. Enthusiasts are unsociable, and dangerous as a result: they 
refuse to acknowledge others who differ from them on purely speculative questions as their 
moral equals, worthy of respect as rational creatures.68 If their self-love fails to expand to 
include all of mankind, it must fail to encompass its ultimate object: God, whom for all their 
protestations of piety they despise and flatter rather than love and honour. Such men stood 
accused by Campbell of wilfully subverting the ‘divine Constitution of Things’, in which in 
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the course of our iterative social interactions our self-love ‘creeps abroad, and stretches itself, 
first to one’s Kindred, next, to those that are allay’d to us; then, it spreads among Friends; 
after that, among those that live in the Neighbourhood, and such as are Friends and Allies to 
the State; and last of all, it widens, and takes within its Compass the whole Race of Mankind’ 
(OMV I.vi.125 n.; citing Cicero, De finibus, Book V). Small wonder if, in responding to his 
orthodox critics, Campbell accused them of a hatred of mankind and God. Such false 
followers of Christ had introduced intolerance into the world; and for Campbell, toleration 
could not hope to salve the wound. As the criteria according to which members of society 
value one another has been corrupted, perhaps irreversibly, Campbell argued that there was 
only one place to look for correction: to Christ. Christ embraced his shame on the Cross, to 
teach mankind that sometimes shamelessness and heterodoxy (‘other opinion’) are necessary 
to pursue the life of virtue and to teach unwilling listeners in pathological and intolerant 
societies of the importance of mutual respect, love and understanding.69  
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